Throughout the 1990s, Jaegwon Kim developed a line of argument that what purport to be nonreductive forms of physicalism are ultimately untenable, since they cannot accommodate the causal efficacy of mental states. His argument has received a great deal of discussion, much of it critical. We believe that, while the argument needs some tweaking, its basic thrust is sound. In what follows, we will lay out our preferred version of the argument and highlight its essential dependence on a causal-powers metaphysic, a dependence that Kim does not acknowledge in his official presentations of the argument. We then discuss two recent physicalist strategies for preserving the causal efficacy of the mental in the face of this sort of challenge, strategies that (ostensibly) endorse a causal powers metaphysics of properties while offering distinctive accounts of the physical realization of mental properties. We argue that neither picture can be satisfactorily worked out, and that seeing why they fail strongly suggests that nonreductive physicalism and a causal powers metaphysic are not compatible, as our original argument contends.
It bears emphasis that this view is not committed to assuming that all causation must amount to something like "pushing," or "pulling," or "knocking," or "the exertion of a force." What is assumed, rather, is solely this: when an instance of a property-the event of the particular's having the property-is a cause, the world unfolds in a certain way after the instance of that property, and that property instance is one of the factors that jointly make the world unfold this way. This is just another way of saying what's come before, that the property instance, and others besides, jointly produce or generate certain effects; they jointly oomph the world into going on in this way rather than that. Because of this, there are certain counterfactuals true of the world ("were the property not to have been instanced, such-and-such effects would not have occurred"). But these counterfactuals are derivative from, and not to be equated with, or seen as the basis of, the causal facts themselves: it's because the property instance was among the factors that jointly produced the relevant happenings that certain corresponding counterfactuals are true. Causally efficacious properties have the power to make the world unfold in ways that it otherwise would not, and this is a fundamental feature about these properties upon which all else (counterfactuals true of them, regularities and patterns that encompass them, explanations that cite them) is derivative.
There is much debate, and not a little confusion, over how to delineate the finer points of this general picture. While we cannot delve deeply into these matters, we make the following two remarks to forestall confusion that might infect understanding of our subsequent argument. First, there is a pervasive manner of speaking that appears on the surface to say that objects have and exercise causal powers. (Witness our example above with respect to defoliants.) In our view, such talk should be construed by the causal powers metaphysician as a shorthand way of expressing the claims that i) the having of the property is the having of the causal power;
ii) the event of the property's being had by the object in appropriate circumstances causally contributes to the effect; and iii) the exercise of the causal power just is this causal contribution.
ii Second, a single property may contribute to a very wide array of effects, depending on the context in which it is instanced. A particle's being negatively charged may contribute to its accelerating at varying rates away from a similarly charged nearby particle, accelerating toward an oppositely charged nearby particle, even accelerating towards a similarly charged particle (though at a slower rate than would occur were the particle not to have been so charged), and countless other manifestations, all depending on the context of its occurrence. But in ordinary speech, again, there is a tendency to talk of a corresponding array of causal powers being exercised, 'each' of which is identified through the effect actually manifested. This sort of speech has encouraged some metaphysicians to posit a multiplicity of properties, or worse, to posit a distinct type of entity (a causal power), any number of which are 'conferred by' a single property. We should resist such moves on grounds of parsimony, and here science is a much better guide to property/power identifications.
iii The key is to understand a basic power or disposition not in terms of this or that salient manifestation, but rather in terms of a unitary causal influence, something that is constant across circumstances while its manifestations will vary.
While we cannot undertake here a defense of this understanding of causation, we will summarize what we take to be some key advantages over two very general rival approaches. The first is the class of broadly Humean reductionist accounts. While details differ considerably, on all Humean accounts, whether one event causes another is a massively nonlocal matter, insofar as causal relations supervene on the global pattern of events across space and time. Should the pattern of future events turn out to be very different from what our best theories now predict, it might 'turn out' that what we thought to be an obvious causal interaction-never mind the details of its nature, the very existence of any causal relationship at all-was no such thing. But this is implausible. So the posit of the N relation is gratuitous, as it can only be put into the world consequent upon the regularity. It is merely a baroque adornment to Humeanism-enough so that we might with justice call it "second-order Humeanism." vi This is so, that is, unless we make the stronger claim that F by its very nature is disposed to bring about G, in which case we are back to the primitive dispositionality of the causal powers metaphysic.
Such, in outline form, are a few central reasons we have for thinking a causal powers metaphysic to be preferable to its main rivals. In considering the prospects for a nonreductive physicalist view of the mental, we are assuming, this metaphysic. We are investigating its implications for the question at hand. Can the (by our lights) rightthinking metaphysician who has seen his way clear to this view of causation make out a nonreductive physicalist view on which mental states are causally efficacious in this sense? We will try to persuade you that the prospects are bleak.
Causal Powers and the Dilemma of Reduction or Causal Exclusion of the Mental
We will now present our preferred version of a Kim-style argument for the reducibility of mental properties to physical properties. vii We begin with three related premises concerning causation and properties:
1) Causation is a real relation irreducible to more basic features of the world.
(causal nonreductionism)
2) Causation involves the exercise of causal powers or capacities of particulars.
(production account of causation)
3) Properties are individuated in terms of causal powers, such that there are no distinct properties that confer exactly the same causal powers.
(causal theory of properties)
The next three premises flow from the distinctive commitments of non-reductive physicalists: Premise (7) is the supposition that there are mental properties that do not reduce to physical properties and whose causal efficacy does not reduce to the causal efficacy of some physical properties. This means, in the schema used in (7), that the singular causal action of the mental event of M's being instanced does not reduce to the singular causal action of some physical event or events (say, the instancing of the physical property P that realizes M in the circumstances). In short, the commitment expressed by (7) is what puts the "non" in "non-reductive" physicalism.
The argument that (7) is inconsistent with (1)-(6) proceeds as follows.
8) The instance of M either (a) directly produces a subsequent mental event, M2, or (b) it directly produces a wholly physical event, P*.
The realization thesis (5) and production account of causation (2) together strongly suggest that option (a) is a nonstarter. On this view, mental events are ontologically dependent on their subvening realizers, wholly constituted by (if not identical to) them, and this is no less true of mental effects as of mental causes. Bringing about such a mental event eo ipso involves causally affecting the physical event which realizes it. So 9) Not (8a).
But the thesis of causal completeness (6) implies that 10) If 8b, then the physical event P* is overdetermined by M and some other physical event.
Now, if we accept the production account of causation, it will seem passing strange to suppose that, in regular fashion, there are physical events that are systematically "overoomphed" by distinct events, even if-indeed, especially if-these causes might stand in a supervenience relation. If, say, a physical event P, the realizer of the mental event M, produces or oomphs P*, what causal work is left over for M? It would be at best a gross violation of parsimony to posit two distinct productive relations for a single event every time mental events supervene on the fundamental physical cause. Note that on reductive accounts of causation, on which causal facts are not something additional to the totality of noncausal facts, the situation looks very different. Suppose, for example, that our effect P* is counterfactually dependent on both P and M. If we accept something like the counterfactual analysis of causation, there is nothing strange or objectionable about deeming M, as well as P, to be a cause of P*. For in doing so we are not making a commitment to anything additional-M's status as a cause of P* falls out of the facts that we already accept along with our analysis. It comes for free. By contrast, on the nonreductive productive account, we would be positing an additional fundamental relation between M and P*, when doing so is entirely unnecessary for accounting causally for P*. Thus, we should conclude that 11) There is not systematic mental-physical overdetermination, as the consequent of 10 implies.
But this is the end of the road. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that 12) M does not make a distinctive contribution to occurrences in the physical world, whether wholly physical or supervening mental occurrences. (Completing Reductio of 7.) Finally, the causal theory of properties (premise 3) both rules out an epiphenomenalist retreat and suggests the proper ultimate conclusion: we ought either to reductively identify M with P or deny that M is a bona fide property-one that earns its causal keep-in the first place.
Non-reductive physicalists see an obstacle to the first option, reductionism, in the fact that, as functional properties, intentional properties are multiply realized. What counts as a belief that Q in humans may be quite distinct, at any physical level of description, from what counts as that same belief in, say, an intelligent extraterrestrial or a sophisticated artificial machine built out of steel and silicon. In reply, Kim recommends that we seek local, species-specific reductive identities for intentional properties-human belief that such-and-such as identical with physical property so-and-so-and so preserve the status of these intentional properties as causal powers. That is, we characterize both M and P in terms of highly specific mental and physical types, respectively, and move to a type-type identity theory.
The second, eliminativist option is to interpret apparent reference to mental properties as properly denoting mental concepts only. There are far fewer properties had by an object than the vast number of concepts it falls under. As indicated in premise (3),
properties are immanent to their instances and make a nonredundant difference to how the objects act in at least some circumstances. (They answer to what Kim calls
The argument just presented, like earlier relatives, seeks a reductionist or eliminativist conclusion by way of arguing for the exclusion of irreducibly mental
causation. Yet it does this by explicitly invoking the thesis of causal powers realistically construed. So let us refer to it hereafter as the power exclusion argument.
As critics of Kim have observed, this argument appears to generalize beyond mental properties to all properties posited in the special sciences (sciences other than basic physics). xi And since, contra Kim, it is highly plausible that special science categories are not ontologically reducible (owing in part to their own multiple realizability) xii , the eliminativist conclusion the argument ultimately invites here is often taken as a reductio ad absurdum: surely the terms of well-established biological and chemical theory pick out genuinely efficacious properties!
Owing to length constraints, we shall not be able to treat this sort of indirect criticism of the argument in detail. We will rest content with the following two-fold response.
First, notice that a rejection of premises (5) and (6), the realization and causal completeness theses, suffice to block the final conclusion of the power exclusion argument. As we discuss later on, we believe the best way to maintain a robust, nonreductive view of the mental is to reject these two premises. Similarly, one might reject the corresponding premises in an exclusion argument directed at special science properties that one takes to be irreducible and efficacious. Recent philosophy of science has seen significant challenge to the completeness thesis in particular.
xiii But second, for one who takes the case for the completeness of physics with respect to some or all special sciences to be convincing, it would not be absurd to accept a causal exclusion conclusion from a corresponding form of argument. For so-called 'high level' theories can be enormously useful and illuminating, and even necessary to the progress of human knowledge of how the world works, without answering to ontological 'levels' or layers populated by distinctive properties and their objects. xiv And the further fact that such theories are not generally reducible to more fundamental theories is a highly interesting fact about our world (and one necessary for science to get off the ground, as in practice we inevitably work our way in, not out), but it cuts no ontological
ice. An alternative to the levels picture of physical reality has already been hinted at above: there is a vast array of microphysical entities (for simplicity, "the particles") bearing primitive, dynamical features and standing in primitive relations. Talk of composite objects and their properties, at least in the general case, is the imposition of a conceptual scheme that selectively picks out coarse-grained patterns running through the vast storm of particles. These concepts really are (objectively) satisfied by the world, but not in virtue of a one-one relation between general concepts and properties, or individual concepts and particulars.
This second response might be thought to entail the devaluation of the special sciences. Such a conclusion would be too hasty, however. For it is simply false that science is of value only as a source of representing the world in more and more accurate ways. It is, in addition, a source of means for intervening and manipulating the world so as to change it for the better, and much of its value is due to this rather than its representational fruits. We value science-we fund it, prioritize it, give special social status to many of its practitioners, etc.-because of its role in improving the world, and not just because of its role in representing the world. (The development of methods for effectively preventing and treating myriad diseases serves as just one example of such improvement.) But qua sources of improvement, some of the special sciences are at least as valuable, and perhaps more so, than fundamental physics. For we are very often better able to intervene and manipulate in ways that improve the world by using the resources of the non-fundamental special sciences.
Returning to the status of mental properties, here, then, is where we are left. The commitments that drive the power exclusion argument-the causal powers metaphysic along with the supervenience, realization, and causal completeness theses of nonreductive physicalism-appear to generate the conclusion that mental properties are either reducible or eliminable. This is serious trouble for philosophers that are neither reductionists nor eliminativists with respect to the mental, and they are legion. Thus, if we wish to preserve the mind as irreducibly efficacious, we must reject one or another of the commitments driving the argument above.
Or so we believe. Sydney Shoemaker, however, disagrees, and has recently attempted to provide a way out for the nonreductive physicalist who is a realist with respect to causal powers. Since Shoemaker has bona fides as both a causal powers metaphysician and as a physicalist, it is fitting that we investigate his approach in detail.
Shoemaker on Non-reductive Mental Causation
Shoemaker thinks that the key to vindicating the causal efficacy of mental properties without reduction lies in a distinctive account of the realization of mental properties by physical properties. In broad strokes, his proposal is that mental and other realized (C1 v C2) is a property realized by each of C1 and C2 just in case:
How is accepting this picture of realization supposed to make things easier for non-reductive physicalism? We begin by observing that if the realized property has a subset of the forward-looking causal features of the realizer, then the realizer property event is causally sufficient for everything the realized property event is causally sufficient for, plus more. So, for example, C1 is causally sufficient for (E1 v E2), just as (C1 v C2)
is, but unlike the disjunctive cause it is also sufficient for an instance of E1. Now, if C1 and (C1 v C2) overlap in this way in what they causally suffice for, and if causal considerations ought to drive our conclusions about the identity of properties, a natural conclusion is that (C1 v C2) is a proper part of C1. More generally: events which instance realized properties are parts of those instancing the corresponding realizers, and so are not identical to them.
From here, Shoemaker invokes a version of Stephen Yablo's "proportionality"
constraint xvi on what we ought to count as "the cause" in a causal interaction: while it is true that C1 is causally sufficient for (E1 v E2), (C1 v C2) is, Yablo and Shoemaker say, a better candidate for being the cause. For (C1 v C2) is also causally sufficient for the specified effect, but only "just so"-it causally suffices for the effect and nothing more besides. The only features of C1 that contribute to the "bringing about" of (E1 v E2) are features had by (C1 v C2), a "part" of C1. And as with a more familiar sort of case, such as Jones's single shot in a firing squad, just ahead of the others, killing the condemned, we are invited to conclude that it is best to say that while the whole (C1; the firing squad's firing) was causally sufficient for the effect ((E1 v E2); the death of the condemned), proportionality constraints argue in favor of counting a particular part ((C1 v C2); Jones's firing) rather than the whole as the cause. xvii This is how realized events in general-and realized mental events in particular-qualify as causes in certain scenarios, such that it is false in these scenarios that the (physical) realizer events are likewise causes of the very same effects.
We now have Shoemaker's account of realization laid out before us, as well as the way it is supposed to provide for non-reductive mental causation. But how, we may wonder, does the account underwrite a response to the power exclusion argument?
Notice, first, that there is no rejection of the supervenience, realization, or completeness theses (premises 4-6). And, of course, Shoemaker intends (7), the anti-reduction premise, to come out true as well. Thus, one who takes our exclusion argument above to be cogent will naturally suspect that Shoemaker's commitment to the causal powers metaphysics (as expressed in premises 1-3) is less than it appears.
To bring the problem into focus, consider first that, for all his distinctive claims, Shoemaker clearly gives ontological priority to the physical realizer event. He tells us that P realizes M just in case P is metaphysically sufficient for (but not identical to) M and 'constitutively makes [it] real ' (2007: 6, 10) . He goes so far as to say that realized states are 'nothing over and above ' their realizers (2007: 2) . If all this is so, then how is a case of M's causing an effect, E, not also a case whereby P, M's constituting realizer, is likewise causing E? Indeed, how is this not a case where P is causally prior to M, so that, by the power exclusion argument, we should conclude that P is the sole true cause? xviii It seems that only a retreat from a causal powers metaphysics could allow you to say that P is somehow 'merely' causally sufficient whereas M is the proper cause. If P is ontologically prior to M, able to bring about E, and in the circumstances necessary to do so, how can it get out-oomphed by M?
The only way for us to make sense of this is by ignoring Shoemaker's talk of P's constitutively making real M and focusing instead on his notion that M is a part of P, A schematic example: microphysical property L confers upon the microphysical entity that bears it only powers α, β, and γ in all circumstances except when it realizes property H, in which case it confers power δ. Now, notice that it's still the case that only microphysical properties contribute the fundamental, irreducible causal powers. (We'll hereafter let the qualifiers "fundamental" and "irreducible" be implicit.) But Gillett argues that the realized property H is nevertheless causally efficacious, for three reasons:
i) H non-causally determines L to contribute the δ power to its bearer,
ii) H is a necessary member of a set of factors jointly sufficient for the contribution of δ to an individual, and iii) positing H as a causally efficacious property is necessary if we are to "account for" the relevant microphysical individual's having power δ. Our basic criticism is this: Gillett's strong emergence provides at best a very attenuated form of causal efficacy for mental properties. They do not produce (nonderivatively) any event or even trigger some other causal power into activity. They seem to be simply the occasion on which microphysical properties act in unusual ways (i.e., ways departing from their nearly ubiquitous manner of activity). In fact, from the perspective of a causal powers theorist, H in our example seems but a handy name for the sort of circumstances in which L confers δ; it answers one sort of "when" question. But it's hard to see what's gained in explanation by insisting on accepting an emergent realized property into our ontology. In fact, this insistence plausibly obscures, for (when combined with "determination" talk) it makes it look as if there's some light being shed on how and why L confers δ when there's not. The sober metaphysical truth seems to be that whenever L is co-instanced with certain other properties in a certain way-where that way and those other properties can be wholly specified in microphysical terms-then L confers δ. We can introduce the term "H" as a label for this type of scenario. But in doing so, we wouldn't be accounting for anything that we hadn't previously accounted for in speaking only of microphysical properties and relations, and we wouldn't have gotten one step closer to understanding how or why L confers δ in the relevant scenarios.
Hence, we don't think we ought to accept Gillett's contention that H, understood as an emergent realized property, is a necessary posit in "accounting for" the contribution of δ by L. xxiv Some will be inclined to reply at this point along the lines of Jerry Fodor's brief on behalf of the standard, non-emergentist variety of nonreductionism: we must recognize H as a real, multiply realized, and explanatory property in its own right because otherwise we will fail to capture the commonality of the many different scenarios, microphysically described, in which L confers δ. Only here the case for H would be bolstered by the fact (ex hypothesi) that the fundamental dynamics are distinctive in nonreductive scenarios. We are unmoved, but suppose one is inclined to concede the point. Even so, all we would have embraced are mental properties that play a kind of structuring role in the world's dynamics. They do no distinctive causal work-provide no extra causal oomph. There is, indeed, a strong analogy here to the role played by spatial and temporal relations in Newtonian mechanics, as construed by a causal powers theorist. xxv Such relations, one might say, provide a necessary framework for the interplay of dispositional entities, while themselves having no dispositional nature. Surely our nonreductionist physicalist wants more than this by way of the causal relevance of the mental. More than being local, nondispositional constraints on the way fundamental physical causes operate, our beliefs, desires, and intentions themselves directly contribute to the unfolding dynamics of our behavior.
A Better Account of Emergence
It thus appears that a rejection of the causal completeness tenet of mainstream physicalism will not in itself suffice to secure a robust efficacy for mental properties. We must also reject the realization thesis, and in the context of mental causation, at least, that is clearly a rejection of physicalism altogether. In our judgment, the best avenue for developing an anti-physicalist view rooted in the rejection of realization and completeness involves a stronger variety of emergence, what is often termed ontological emergence.
The term "emergence" is used to cover a multitude of sympathies (in some cases, sins). So we want to indicate in clear, albeit very abstract, terms what an emergentist picture would look like, in our way of thinking.
Properties are ontologically emergent just in case:
(i) They are ontologically basic properties (token-distinct from, and unrealized by, any structural properties of the system).
(ii) As basic properties, they constitute new powers in the systems that have them, powers that non-redundantly contribute to the system's collective causal power, which is otherwise determined by the aggregations of, and relations between, the properties of the system's microphysical parts. Such non-redundant causal power necessarily means a difference even at the microphysical level of the system's unfolding behavior. (This is compatible with the thesis that the laws of particle physics are applicable to such systems. It requires only that such laws be supplemented to account for the interaction of large-scale properties with the properties of small-scale systems.)
In respects (i) and (ii), emergent properties are no less basic ontologically than unit negative charge is taken to be by current physics. However, emergent and microphysical properties differ in that (iii) emergent properties appear in and only in organized complex systems of an empirically specifiable sort and persist if and only if the system maintains the requisite organized complexity. The sort of complexity at issue can be expected to be insensitive to continuous small-scale dynamical changes at the microphysical level.
xxvi
We are inclined to further suppose (though this may depend on our inclination to accept a controversial, strong causal explanatory principle) that (iv) the appearance of emergent properties is causally originated and sustained by the joint efficacy of the qualities and relations of some of the system's fundamental parts.
(This would involve fundamental properties having latent dispositions to contribute to effects, dispositions that are triggered only in organized complexes of the requisite sort.)
One cannot give uncontroversial examples of emergent properties, of course.
Though there are ever so many macroscopic phenomena that seem to be governed by principles of organization highly insensitive to microphysical dynamics, it remains an open question whether such behavior is nonetheless wholly determined, in the final analysis, by ordinary particle dynamics of microphysical structures in and around the system in question. xxvii Given the intractable difficulties of trying to compute values for the extremely large number of particles in any medium-sized system (as well as the compounding error of innumerable applications of approximation techniques used even in measuring small-scale systems), it may well forever be impossible in practice to attempt to directly test for the presence or absence of a truly (ontologically) emergent feature in a macroscopic system. Furthermore, it is difficult to try to spell out in any detail the impact of such a property using a realistic (even if hypothetical) example, since (and, perhaps, initial conditions) , or that it could "emerge" at macrolevels ("Could Hume be right about fundamental physics but wrong about macro-objects and events?"), or that it might be "implemented" or "realized" by something more basic, like energy flow or momentum transfer.
ii One might hold to a philosophical view leading one to insist that in certain cases, it is indeed the object that exercises the power, and not the event of the object's having the property/causal power. See Kim 1993 , 2005 See for example the variation among Fodor 1974; Pereboom and Kornblith 1991 and Pereboom 2002; Shoemaker 2001 and and Gillett 2002. ix We will ignore the complication of indeterministic causation, which would require us to formulate the completeness thesis in terms of fixing the chances of the effect. x We will, for the sake of convenience, continue to refer only to P, the single realizer of M, though it should be understood that on some accounts of realization M may be realized by multiple properties ("the P's," say) each time it is instanced. As we'll see below, Gillett 2002 is one such account. xi For discussion, see Baker 1993; Burge 1993; van Gulick 1993; Kim 1996 Kim , 1997 Kim , 1999 Kim , 2003 Kim , 2005 Block 2003; Ross and Spurrett 2004. xii See Fodor 1974; Dupré 1993; and Rosenberg 1994. xiii See Cartwright 1999 and Dupré 1993 See Shoemaker 2001: 81 and 2007: 13-14 . xviii A bolstering consideration comes from certain indeterministic scenarios. We take it to be evident that, assuming the causal completeness of physics, the chance of E given M cannot be greater than the chance of E given a total physical cause (here, our P). But there seems to be no reason to think that it cannot be less. Now consider a case where Pr (E/M) is significantly less than Pr(E/P). Surely in such a case, where E in fact occurs, it is highly implausible to insist nevertheless that M, not P, is the cause of E. While this is a special case, if our conclusion from it is accepted, it indicates further that there is something wrong about Shoemaker's method for assigning causes. See Gillett 2003a: 109; 2006a: 6-7; 2006b: 268. Though more deserves to be said in response, we'll here say only that a causal powers theorist is under no obligation to accept, and may have good reason to reject, each of the four additional candidates for non-causal determination relations Gillett proposes. The grounds in favor of this response are, in brief, that (i) questions about which properties count as causally efficacious (in a causal nonreductionist sense) ought to be settled prior to any commitment concerning the first three proposed relations, and (ii) a causal powers theorist inclined toward "sparseness" with respect to properties will reject the sort of conditional power-conferring properties Gillett invokes (in his 2003a: 101 and 2006b: 279-280, 285-286) as the relata of the fourth proposed relation. xxv Gillett anticipates this analogy by deeming spatial relations entities that (if they exist) "do not contribute powers themselves" but "may still determine the contributions of powers to individuals by other properties and relations " (2003b: 35 
